Liquidity Risk and Banks’ Bidding Behavior: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis by Adam Geršl & Zlatuše Komárková
Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                    577 
JEL Classification: E58, G21 
Keywords: funding liquidity, market liquidity, global financial crisis 
Liquidity Risk and Banks’ Bidding Behavior: 
Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis
*
Adam GERŠL – Czech National Bank and Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University, 
Prague (adam.gersl@cnb) 
Zlatuše KOMÁRKOVÁ – Czech National Bank (zlatuse.komarkova@cnb.cz)
Abstract 
Even in countries that were not directly hit by the global financial crisis and where 
the banking system had a relatively strong liquidity position, there has been a negative 
spiral between the market and funding liquidity. We illustrate this on a case study of 
the Czech banking system. We construct indices of market and funding liquidity using daily 
market data, including data on banks’ bidding behavior in repo operations of the Czech 
National Bank. We find some evidence of a negative feedback effect between market and 
funding liquidity, especially after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.  
1. Introduction 
The concept of liquidity has received a renewed attention during the global 
financial crisis that started in summer 2007 in the U.S. sub-prime mortgage market. 
Before the crisis, economists and policymakers concentrated on causes and conse-
quences of the global excess liquidity, a macroeconomic concept reflecting a sharp 
rise in credit and the money stock in 2003–2007. After the turmoil started, the focus 
shifted to microeconomic and structural concepts of both market liquidity of relevant 
financial markets and funding liquidity of financial institutions, mainly banks.  
We focus on two key dimensions of liquidity: market liquidity and funding 
liquidity. Markets are liquid if a market participant can trade assets without signif-
icantly changing the market price. Funding liquidity denotes a situation where an in-
stitution can meet outstanding obligations and is able to raise cash if needed. While 
conceptually different, the two notions of liquidity are interlinked, a hypothesis cor-
roborated by the evidence from the global financial crisis. Especially in developed 
financial markets, such as those in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the euro 
area, there were occasions when liquidity in certain market segments dried out com-
pletely and, simultaneously, some financial institutions experienced problems with 
settling obligations in timely manner. 
The aim of this article is to test whether the link between market and funding 
liquidity exists also in countries that had no or virtually no relevant exposures to 
the  U.S. sub-prime market, and where the  banking system had a  relatively strong 
liquidity position. To examine our hypothesis, we select one such country, namely 
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the Czech Republic, and construct separate indices of market and funding liquidity, 
using daily market data.
1 While this is a common practice for market liquidity in-
dices, funding liquidity is usually measured by indicators based on balance sheet 
data. To construct a market-based funding liquidity index, we apply a slightly modified 
version of a strategy suggested by Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009), using data from 
commercial banks’ bidding behavior in repo operations of the Czech National Bank 
(CNB). Subsequently, we show that during the peak of the financial crisis (i.e. in 
the  months that followed the  collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008), 
indices of market liquidity and funding liquidity exhibited a high degree of co-move-
ment.  
The main contribution of the article consists in showing that the Drehmann 
and Nikolaou (2009) approach can be used to assess funding liquidity risks even in 
monetary systems where central bank absorbs liquidity from the  markets, i.e. in 
a setting where banks do not bid for liquidity in market operations of the central 
bank. Further research could replicate this analysis for other countries. This would 
require detailed data on balance sheets of individual banks and data related to their 
behavior in monetary operations, which are not easily available. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides definitions of market 
and funding liquidity and discusses their possible links that can lead to a downward 
liquidity spiral. Sections 3 and 4 explain, respectively, the construction of the market 
liquidity index for Czech financial markets, and the market-based indicator of fund-
ing liquidity of Czech banks. Section 5 analyzes the evolution of both indices during 
the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Market Liquidity versus Funding Liquidity 
Market liquidity can be defined as the ability of market participants to execute 
financial transactions in assets of a given volume without causing a significant change 
in their prices.
2 Market liquidity risk can be then defined as the probability that mar-
ket transactions cannot occur or can take place only with a significant impact on 
market clearing prices (Kyle, 1985).  
Three basic dimensions of market liquidity are usually differentiated in the lit-
erature (Kyle, 1985; Fleming, 2003): tightness, depth, and resiliency. Market tight-
ness reflects low costs of unwinding a certain position, meaning that the  price at 
which individual transactions can be undertaken is not very different from the aver-
age market prices. Market depth stands for the ability to execute large transactions 
without excessively affecting the current market prices of an asset. Finally, market 
resiliency is linked to the speed at which prices recover from a random shock.  
Funding liquidity, on the  other hand, is a  feature of an  institution (a bank, 
usually) rather than a market. There are several definitions of funding liquidity which 
overlap to some extent. Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) define funding liquidity as 
the ability to settle obligations with immediacy. According to the IMF, funding li-
quidity is defined as the ability of a solvent institution to make agreed-upon pay-
ments in a timely fashion (IMF, 2008a). Borio (2000) or Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2007) define funding liquidity as the ability to raise cash at short notice either via 
1 For the discussion of relative strengths of the Czech banking system see CNB (2009). 
2 A detailed definition of a liquid market (as applied to the stock market) can be found in Black (1971). Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                    579 
asset sales or new borrowing. Because the  ability of an  institution to settle obli-
gations in timely manner is related to the structure of its balance sheet and is usually 
applied to banks, funding liquidity is often called banking liquidity or balance sheet 
liquidity.
3  
Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) also define funding liquidity risk as the pos-
sibility that over a  specific horizon an  institution (a bank) will become unable to 
settle its obligations with immediacy. They emphasize that it is important to differ-
entiate between funding liquidity and funding liquidity risk. They argue that while 
funding liquidity is a binary concept (a bank can settle obligations or not) and is 
associated with a particular point in time, funding liquidity risk can in principle reach 
infinitely many values and is measured over a particular horizon.
4  
Theoretical and practical research has rationalized strong interactions between 
funding liquidity risk and market liquidity, especially in periods of crisis (Brunner-
meier and Pedersen, 2007; Drehmann and Nikolaou, 2009; Praet and Herzberg, 2008; 
Frank et al., 2008). Simply put, shocks to funding liquidity can lead to asset sales, 
and may reduce asset prices. Continuous downward pressure on prices can have con-
siderable consequences for market liquidity. This can lead to a feedback loop if lower 
market liquidity leads to higher margin calls, which in turn increase funding liquidity 
risk as outflows rise. As banks always try to remain liquid they launch a new round 
of asset sales which starts a downward liquidity spiral.  
The adverse liquidity spiral can also start from market illiquidity. Impaired 
market liquidity can hit a bank on both sides of its balance sheet. Assets may become 
unsalable in the extreme case of absolute market illiquidity and due to a lack of 
trading their value decreases. At the same time, the bank is not able to improve its 
impaired funding liquidity position through its liability side (by issuing securities or 
borrowing in the interbank market). When funding liquidity is tight, traders (mostly 
banks as main market makers starting to hoard liquidity) become reluctant to take on 
positions (especially in high-margin securities). This lowers market liquidity and in 
turn increases the risk of funding a trade, thus increasing the margins and funding 
liquidity risk.  
The risk of an adverse liquidity spiral increases with stronger linkages be-
tween banks and securities markets. Praet and Herzberg (2008) give a number of 
reasons supporting the existence of a strong links between banks and markets. First, 
banks are major issuers of securities (both bonds and stocks). Second, interbank 
funding have become more dependent on market liquidity, as interbank transactions 
have been increasingly carried out through repurchase agreements. Third, banks have 
been increasingly mobilizing their traditional government and corporate bond port-
folios to finance less liquid but higher yielding forms of assets that again can be 
reused as collateral. Fourth, profound changes in liquidity management have been 
implemented with a view to increase efficiency and manage operational risks. Fifth, 
banks have been increasingly supplying the market with new securitized products, 
structuring and repackaging in tranches illiquid assets which they redistributed to 
investors with corresponding risk preferences. Finally, bank lending has taken on 
3 See Praet and Herzberg (2008) or CNB (2009). 
4 Praet and Herzberg (2008) define banking liquidity risk as the inability of a bank to meet outstanding ob-
ligations at a reasonable cost. For the discussion on differences between various definitions of funding
liquidity and funding liquidity risk see Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009). 580                                             Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
new forms, including direct lending to specialized investors such as hedge funds that 
are very active market participants. All of these aspects have played an important 
role in the recent financial turmoil, and contributed to the observed adverse liquidity 
spiral that followed in developed financial markets especially after the collapse of 
the U.S. investment bank Lehmann Brothers in September 2008. 
3. Construction of a Market Liquidity Index for the Czech Financial Markets 
The construction of a market liquidity index for the Czech financial markets 
follows the  methodology applied by major central banks (e.g., Bank of England, 
2007, and European Central Bank, 2007). We first look for variables that would cap-
ture the three basic dimensions of market liquidity, i.e. tightness, depth, and resil-
iency, and construct sub-indices for four relevant market segments: money market, 
bond market, foreign exchange (FX) market, and stock market. Given that the Czech 
financial markets are much less developed than for instance those in the  United 
Kingdom and the euro area, the range of possible variables capturing the above men-
tioned basic dimensions is somewhat limited.  
Market tightness is measured by the bid-ask spread, i.e. the difference between 
the (best) prices at which a financial instrument can be bought and sold. If bid-ask 
spreads are narrow, market liquidity is high, as the price at which individual trans-
actions can be undertaken is only marginally distinct from the average market prices. 
On the other hand, if market liquidity is tight, bid-ask spreads are large, as the market 
maker wants to be compensated for the difficulty of realizing a possible prompt sale 
of an asset. Table 1 shows bid-ask spreads across the four selected markets.  
As regards market depth, a frequently used indicator is the total volume be-
longing to all bids in the order book. However, the order book or transaction level 
data are not easily available, so we approximate this dimension by daily turnover 
volumes. This is based on the notion that a larger turnover makes it more likely that 
a sizeable transaction can be performed in a short time without a significant shift in 
market prices. Total volume data are available for all market segments, except for 
the  FX market. For further calculations, the  volume data were detrended by sub-
tracting a linear trend.  
Market resiliency can be measured by the price impact indicators, which ba-
sically express the extent of the price change caused by a given size of order flow. 
Similarly to market depth, for the calculation of the price change resulting from  
order flows microstructural data, such as intraday transaction and quotation data are 
needed, but these are not easily available. Thus, we measure market resiliency by 
the  ratio of the  return to the  transaction volume (the return-to-volume ratio). It is 
assumed that in illiquid markets, the price will move more for a given trading volume 
than in liquid conditions, so the ratio should be higher. Similarly to market depth 
variables, the data are available for all market segments, except for FX markets. 
Given that measuring the individual dimensions of market liquidity involves 
approximation using relatively aggregate measures in the case of a lack of order book 
data, supplemental variables that are linked to market liquidity can be used (ECB, 
2007). We included a proxy for liquidity premium and the market volatility index. 
The liquidity premium can be understood as a form of compensation demanded by 
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uncertain future market conditions. In calculation of the liquidity premia, we have 
been limited by the lack of relevant data as the Czech financial system is not so 
extensive in all its segments. However, for two markets (money and government 
bond), we gauged two possible indicators of the liquidity premia: for money market, 
the difference between the two-week interbank rate and two-week CNB repo rate
5 
and for government bond market, the difference between bond yields and interest 
rates swaps (so-called asset swap spread) with the  same maturity (Table 1). It is 
expected that the wider spreads between the rates are, the higher liquidity premia are 
demanded and the less liquid markets are.
6  
The volatility index is used as a supplementary indicator of market resiliency. 
Consistent with the theory and practice, highly volatile market prices are likely to 
reflect low liquidity, as the price reacts too much to every trade given the lack of 
possible counterparties in the order book prepared to trade for the last price. We in-
clude this variable for each market segment (Table 1).
7  
Table 1  Dimensions and Variables for the Calculation of Market Liquidity Index 
Dimension  Description  Money market  FX market  Bond market  Stock market 
Tightness Bid-ask spreads 
O/N, 1W, 2W, 
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yields (2Y, 3Y, 
4Y, 5Y, 10Y, 
15Y) 
Volatility  30-days historical 
volatility 
Czeonia index  CZK/EUR  10Y benchmark 
bond yield 
Index PX 
MM_indicator  FX_indicator  GB_indicator  SM_indicator 
Indicator 
Market liquidity indicator 
Notes: O/N = overnight, W = week, M = month, Y = year, PRIBOR (BID) = Prague InterBank Offered (Bid) 
Rate, Index PX = main stock price index of the Prague Stock Exchange, IRS = interest rate swap,  
CZK = Czech Koruna, USD = United States Dollar, EUR = euro, GBP = sterling, CHF = Swiss franc, 
Czeonia = CZEch OverNight Index Average,  
* the daily volume is always de-trended 
Source: authors 
5 The CNB repo rate is the main instrument of Czech monetary policy. 
6 The spreads calculated in the above mentioned way include also other risk premia, mainly the credit/
/counterparty risk premium.  
7 We are aware of the fact that higher volatility does not always reflect lower liquidity, but we still see
some merit in including it among the variables used to construct the market liquidity index given its rela-
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For each relevant market, all time series entering the calculation were first 
normalized (using the mean and standard deviation of the whole available time span) 
and then averaged within each of the five dimensions presented in Table 1. Each 
dimension represents an equal part of the compiled sub-indices for the four individ-
ual market segments, which are subsequently smoothed using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter (MM_indicator, FX_indicator, GB_indicator and SM_indicator). Finally, the over-
all market liquidity index is calculated as a simple (unweighted) average of the four 
(smoothed) sub-indices.
8 Given that the underlying values are normalized, the units 
in which the index is expressed are standard deviations from historical average. We 
smoothed the individual sub-indices to more clearly indicate the trend in the market 
liquidity. The smoothing was applied at the level of the sub-indices (rather than at 
the level of the overall market liquidity index) to enable clear assessment of liquidity 
trends in individual market segments.
9  
The five dimensions and the four market segments were given equal weights 
in the composition of the sub-indices and the aggregate index, respectively, as it is ex 
ante difficult to assess overall relevance of the individual dimensions and segments. 
For example, for banks, stock market liquidity is probably less relevant than money 
market liquidity, but this may not hold for other market participants including for ex-
ample households investing in stock markets through mutual funds.  
Clearly, our market liquidity index is only a proxy for overall market liquidi-
ty. It is impossible to eliminate from the index certain temporary investors’ behavior 
that is not necessarily related to market liquidity, such as speculation on changes in 
monetary policy rates.  
For other countries in the Central and Eastern European region, we are aware 
only of the Hungarian financial market liquidity index compiled by the Hungarian 
National Bank (Páles and Varga, 2008), which uses a very similar methodology. They 
calculate sub-indices for the  three basic dimensions (across relevant market seg-
ments, which exclude the stock market but include the FX swap market), followed by 
a calculation of an overall index.
10  
4. Construction of a Market-Based Funding Liquidity Indicator for Czech Banks 
Funding liquidity is usually measured by indicators based on balance sheet 
data, such as the ratio of variously defined liquid assets to total or short-term liabil-
ities, or the deposit-to-loan ratio. These are available usually at monthly frequency. 
However, funding liquidity may deteriorate very quickly over a few days, so ideally 
a more frequent (daily or weekly) indicator of funding liquidity risk would be ap-
propriate to monitor the liquidity situation in financial institutions.  
Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) suggested a way to derive an indicator based 
on data from banks’ bidding behavior in open market operations of the European 
8 This index is available from 2000, although until end-2001 it excludes the government bond market, for 
which data are available only from 2002 (see Section 5). 
9 See for example CNB (2009, p. 34). 
10 Market liquidity indices exist for some emerging markets outside the Central and Eastern European re-
gion, usually constructed by the central banks to facilitate their financial stability monitoring. Examples are
the stock market liquidity index for China (Lee and Wong, 2009) or market liquidity index for Chile
(Banco central de Chile, 2007, p. 25).  Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                    583 
Figure 1  Deposit-to-Loan Ratios in Selected EU Countries 
(%; 2008; resident loans and deposits; non-bank institutions) 
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Notes: EA  =  euro area; EU  =  average for all EU countries; CZ  =  Czech Republic; SK  =  Slovak Republic; 
PL = Poland; BG = Bulgaria; RO = Romania; HU = Hungary; SI = Slovenia; LT = Lithuania; EE = Estonia; 
LV = Latvia;  BE = Belgium;  DE = Germany;  AT = Austria;  FR = France;  UK = United  Kingdom; 
SE = Sweden; DK = Denmark. 
Sources: European Central Bank; authors’ caluclations. 
 
Central Bank (ECB). Open market operations conducted by the ECB in weekly fre-
quency serve to provide short-term liquidity (central bank money for a given maturity 
of one week) to banks in exchange for sufficient collateral.
11 Within the operations, 
individual banks submit bids (volume and price) for the central bank money provided 
that the bid rate cannot be lower that the minimum bid rate set by the ECB Govern-
ing Council. The auction is price-discriminating, i.e. each successful bidder pays for 
his bid. On the marginal rate, bids may be rationed if the total demand for central 
bank money is higher than the planned allotment.
12  
Theoretical findings by Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) suggest that a  bank 
needing to raise cash to settle obligations will bid more aggressively in such an auc-
tion, i.e. submit higher bid rate and larger volume, especially if it cannot get liquidity 
in the interbank market. Using these findings, Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) build 
an indicator that is based on the difference between the bid rate and the policy rate 
(adjusted by the relative share of each bank in the total allotted volume). The higher 
bid rate and the larger volume demanded by a bank (relative to the total allotment) 
reflects higher funding liquidity risk of that particular bank.
13  
The Czech banking system features relatively high balance-sheet liquidity due 
to the exceptionally high deposit-to-loan ratio in comparison to both new EU coun-
tries as well as other selected EU countries or the euro area (Figure 1). The liquidity 
surplus of the banking system is absorbed by the CNB via its open market opera-
tions in the form of repo tenders. The tenders are harmonized with the ECB tenders. 
11There are also some other less frequent fine-tuning operations and tenders with the maturity of 3 months. 
12 This description was valid only until 7 October 2008 when the ECB changed the operations to a fixed 
rate tender procedure with full allotment at the policy rate to satisfy any demand for short-term liquidity 
provided the bank had sufficient collateral. For details, see: 
http://www.ecb.int/mopo/implement/omo/html/index.en.html.  
13 To construct an aggregated indicator of funding liquidity risk, Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) sum the in-
dicator across all banks for each auction. 584                                             Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
The only differences are that the CNB tenders have a two-week maturity (rather than 
one), are used to absorb rather than provide liquidity to the banking sector, and are 
organized three times a week.
14  
At the first sight, it seems that the liquidity-absorbing nature of the CNB’s 
repo tenders prevent us to apply the Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) logic to construct 
a funding liquidity risk indicator out of the bidding behavior of Czech banks. How-
ever, because a bank gives up liquidity in the repo operations for two weeks, it is 
reasonable to assume that the bank’s bidding behavior will also reflect an assessment 
of its own liquidity needs and thus the funding liquidity risk. We thus start by assum-
ing that a bank’s behavior in a tender (i.e. both the volume bid and the rate bid) is 
a function of its balance-sheet liquidity.  
In systems where banks traditionally demand liquidity from the central bank 
(e.g. in the euro area), banks with deteriorating balance-sheet liquidity will bid higher 
amounts more aggressively at an interest rate which is further from (higher than) 
the set (minimum) limit rate. In the Czech Republic, where the CNB traditionally 
absorbs liquidity from banks, banks will be less willing to deposit their liquidity with 
the CNB for two weeks in the case of deteriorating balance-sheet liquidity and will 
do so only at the maximum (limit rate). 
The construction of the market indicator of funding liquidity risk (MIFL) is 
based on a modification of the approach used by Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009). 
We first calculate the so-called “adjusted bid” (AB) for each bank i and each day of 
tender t according to the equation below, which combines information about the spread 
between the maximum (limit) repo rate and the bid rate and about the relative bid 













The bid volume must be weighted by the total volume absorbed to capture 
factors leading to a change in the bid volume that are not caused by a change in 
the perceived balance-sheet liquidity risk and are common to all banks (e.g. a change 
in the repo rate or generally lower tender volumes). The main difference to the ad-
justed bids constructed by Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009) is the  opposite inter-
pretation of this variable that arises from the liquidity-absorbing nature of CNB 
operations, i.e. lower (rather than higher) values of AB stand for higher funding 
liquidity risk. The  highest funding liquidity risk corresponds to a  situation where 
a bank is bidding at the maximum (limit) rate, thus the  AB is equal to zero. This 
behavior is interpreted as increased concern about a lack of liquidity on the part of 
the bank. 
One dimension of bidding behavior that is not captured by the AB is a bank’s 
decision not to participate in the CNB tender on a given day at all. This would cor-
respond to an increase in funding liquidity risk as the bank prefers to hold money (for 
example in the form of an O/N deposit at other banks or at the central bank) and pay 
14 Before May 2006, the CNB repo tenders were conducted daily.  
15 If a bank made more than one bid in a single tender or if more than one tender took place in a single day, 
the bids were averaged. Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                    585 
the opportunity cost in the form of foregone interest. Thus, we sum the AB either 
across several tender days (for example in a month) for each bank or across banks for 
each day of the tender.  
The last step involves a transformation of the summed AB (either for a bank 
or for a  day) to enhance interpretation and presentation. The  final MIFL was 
calculated as a logarithm of the inverse of the summed ABs to achieve “higher MIFL 
higher risk” relationship. However, as the AB often equals zero and so may the sum 
of ABs, before creating the  inverse the sum of ABs was adjusted by a very small 
constant  İ that is ensuring the  existence of an  inverse value for any number 
(including zero). Thus, a bank’s MIFL for a given time span (for example a month) 
was calculated as  














while a day’s (or tender’s) MIFL was calculated as 














where I corresponds to the number of participating banks in the given tender. 
Higher MIFL indicates a greater risk of an outflow of balance-sheet liquidity, 
while lower MIFL indicates a low funding liquidity risk. We set the constant İ to 1E-5, 
so that the resulting MIFL ranges between 0 and 5. It takes the highest value of 5 if 
a bank (or banks for the day’s MIFL) enters repo tenders with the CNB at the limit 
rate, i.e. the highest possible rate. The data for all 23 participating banks were avail-
able for the period May 2007 to March 2009
16 and thus cover the most important 
period of the global financial crisis for the Czech Republic, including the increased 
risk aversion towards the Central and Eastern Europe between December 2008 and 
end-February 2009 (CNB 2009). 
Figure 2 shows the banks’ monthly MIFL for as a function of the average 
traditional balance-sheet liquidity indicators (the ratios of quick liquid assets to 
assets, to liabilities and to deposits) lagged by one month to capture the fact that 
the bidding behavior is to some extent influenced by the liquidity position in the pre-
vious period.
17 The figure suggests that there is a negative correlation between the ra-
tios and the MIFL (of around -20%; the slope coefficient in Figure 2 is - 0.01 and is 
16 The Czech banking sector consists of 36 banks including branches of foreign banks and specialized sav-
ings buildings societies. The 23 banks that participate in the repo operations with the CNB are the most 
important banks in the country (in terms of both size and activity on the markets), and represent almost 
90% of the banking sector assets. 
17 We also compared the results using banks’ balance-sheet ratios and MIFL of the same month and they 
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Figure 2  Relationship between the “Ratio Indicators” of Funding: 
Liquidity and the Market Index of Funding Liquidity (MIFL) 
(x-axis: average ratios of banks in different months;  
 y-axis: MIFL of banks in the following month) 
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Sources: Czech National Bank; authors’ calculations. 
 
significant at 1% percentage level) and supports the hypothesis that banks with weaker 
funding liquidity position tend to bid more aggressively (in the sense of biding at 
the maximum limit rate).  
The clustering of observations at MIFL = 5 is due to many banks bidding in 
some months at the maximum limit rate. The visible “gap” between MIFL values 
around 4 and 5 is due to selected level of İ and is kept intentionally to emphasize 
the “terminal” value of 5.
18  
5. Liquidity and the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 
The Czech financial system has not been severely affected by the global finan-
cial turmoil (CNB 2008, 2009). Reflecting mainly their strong focus on retail bank-
ing in the  as yet unsaturated Czech market, Czech financial institutions had low 
exposures to toxic assets. The stability of the domestic banking sector in times of fi-
nancial market turbulence has also been fostered by banks' high balance-sheet liquid-
ity and thus minimum dependence on interbank markets, funds from foreign markets 
or parent companies.  
The global financial crisis nonetheless to some extent affected the liquidity on 
Czech financial markets, as illustrated by the  market liquidity index (Figure 3). 
The index signaled declining market liquidity in late 2007 and early 2008, followed 
by a  sharp drop during the  peak of the  global financial crisis in the  months that 
followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Nevertheless, when 
compared to the development of similar indices for the U.K. financial markets (Fig-
ure 3),
19 the euro area (ECB 2009) or global financial markets (IMF 2009), liquidity 
18 Higher levels of İ such as 1E-4 would not produce such a big gap, but there would be a risk of having 
the same value of MIFL for situations with all banks bidding at marginal rate and situation where for ex-
ample one small bank bids with a positive AB. 
19 The UK market liquidity index is constructed as a simple unweighted average of nine liquidity meas-
ures, normalised on the period 1999–2004. The series shown is an exponentially weighted moving average 
(Bank of England, 2007). Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                    587 
Figure 3  Overall Market Liquidity Indices for the Czech
and the U.K. Financial Markets 


















UK liquidity index CZ liquidity index (right-hand scale)  
Sources: Czech National Bank; Bank of England; Bloomberg; authors’ calculations. 
Figure 4  Partial Market Liquidity Indices for the Czech Financial Markets 
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Sources: Czech National Bank; Bloomberg; authors’ calculations. 
on the Czech financial market was not impaired that much. Hungarian liquidity index 
followed the same direction as the other indices. The largest decline was evident after 
the fall of Lehman Brothers and at the beginning of this year. The Hungarian index is 
currently higher, but below pre-crisis values (MNB 2009, p. 32, Chart 2-11).
20  
The decline in overall market liquidity index was due to a decline in all mar-
ket liquidity sub-indices for individual market segments (Figure 4). While in the FX 
market the decline in liquidity was driven by a combination of wider spreads and 
a sudden increase in volatility, in the money market it was driven by several simul-
taneous factors. Bid-offer spreads widened at all maturities from 10 basis points to 
around 30 basis points, all interbank rates with longer maturities started significantly 
exceeding the monetary policy rate, trading decreased at maturities longer than one 
week, and activity was concentrated mostly in the overnight segment. Trading ac-
tivity decreased and bid-ask spreads widened also in the stock market.  
20 A comparison with the euro area, the U.K. and global market liquidity indices reveals that while the pat-
tern is similar, the global, euro area and the U.K. indices increased much more in the „good“ times of low 
risk aversion and global excess of liquidity in the years 2003–2007 and decreased much more during 
the global financial crisis 2007-2009 (ECB, 2009, p. 65, Chart 3.1.; Bank of England, 2009, p. 5, Chart 1; 
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Figure 5  Market Index of Funding Liquidity (MIFL) 
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Sources: Czech National Bank; authors’ calculations. 
 
Market liquidity problems were also observed in the Czech government bond 
market. In mid-October 2008, in a situation of excess government bond supply on 
the market, particularly on the part of foreign institutional investors,
21 market-mak-
ers’ bid-offer spread widened from the usual 20 basis points to about 300 points. This 
wide spread temporarily almost paralyzed trading in this market via market-makers 
(CNB, 2009).
22  
As a whole, the Czech banking system recorded no major balance-sheet li-
quidity difficulties. There were no bank runs, panics or large withdrawals of liquidity 
from bank accounts by households and firms.
23 However, the deterioration in market 
liquidity led to concerns about fund availability, and decreased confidence in finan-
cial institutions. This stimulated liquidity hoarding, leading to an increased concen-
tration of liquidity in a small group of banks. Thus, as a result of declining market 
liquidity, the funding liquidity risk increased. This has been reflected in the decrease 
in the overall liquidity withdrawn in the CNB two-week repo tenders.  
The market index of funding liquidity (MIFL) calculated across all banks for 
each day of the tender measures the risk of an outflow of balance-sheet liquidity for 
the banking sector as a whole. Figure 5 shows that this risk increased primarily in 
2008/Q3 and early 2009, when banks’ interest in entering tenders with the CNB de-
creased, and if they did enter them it had to be at a price close to the maximum rate 
(i.e. the AB equals 0 and thus the MIFL equals 5). The spikes in December 2007 and 
early 2008 correspond to days where there have been some frictions already in 
the global markets, the December one partly explained by end-of-year effects. 
The MIFL indicator supports increased concerns regarding a shortage of li-
quid funds on the market and the hoarding of liquid funds by banks in response to 
the worsening market situation following the September 2008 events. We can docu- 
21 Excess market supply of government bonds may have been partly related to a change in the range of col-
lateral accepted by the ECB for operations in the Eurosystem. As the demand for eligible collateral accept-
ed by the ECB increased, the supply of other high-quality securities, including Czech government bonds,
increased in parallel.  
22 The trading volume on the secondary government bond market did not fall, however. Trades continued 
to be carried out through the system of brokers instead of market makers. 
23 However, there was a temporary increase in currency in circulation, see CNB (2009). Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                    589 
Figure 6  Relationship between Market Liquidity and the MIFL 
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Notes: The individual points are the tender dates (total of 283 points) ranging from 2 May 2007 to 2 March 
2009. As the tenders were organized three times a week, the number of the data points is lower than 
what would correspond to daily frequency.  
Sources: Czech National Bank; Bloomberg; authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 7  Relationship between the “Ratio Indicators” of Funding Liquidity 
and the MIFL in Two Different Periods of the Crisis 
(x-axis: average ratios of banks in different months; 
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Sources: Czech National Bank; authors’ calculations. 
ment a downward spiral between funding liquidity risk and market liquidity by juxta-
posing the MIFL for each day and the market liquidity index. Figure 6 confirms some 
correlation between market and balance-sheet liquidity risk perceived in the whole 
banking sector (as measured by the MIFL) of around -53% (statistically significant at 
1% level) and shows that the risk of an outflow of balance-sheet liquidity increased 
in the Czech Republic after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
a period in which the market liquidity declined as well.  
We can also document that those banks that had weaker funding liquidity as 
measured by the traditional ratio indicators were bidding even more aggressively in 
the CNB repo tenders after the Lehman Brothers collapse (Figure 7). The linear re- 590                                             Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
Figure 8  CNB: Absorbed versus Provided Liquidity 
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Source: Czech National Bank. 
 
gression line which shows the relationship between ratio indicators of funding li-
quidity and the banks’ MIFL has steepened in the period between September 2008 
and March 2009.
24  
In October 2008, as a reaction to the evolving adverse liquidity spiral that man-
ifested itself in frictions in the interbank and the government bond market, the CNB 
introduced a liquidity-providing facility in the form of a fixed rate tender procedure 
with full allotment at the policy rate plus margin. This new type of operation allowed 
government bonds to be accepted as collateral (in addition to short-term bills). This 
helped ease market participants’ concerns regarding the potential illiquidity of these 
securities. This proved useful especially for smaller banks that were lacking liquidity 
and were unable to find it in the dysfunctional interbank market or secondary govern-
ment bond market. However, the amounts of the central bank money provided within 
this facility is much smaller that the volumes that are withdrawn (Figure 8). This can 
be interpreted along two different veins, both positive. First, relatively small amounts 
of liquidity injections (when compared to liquidity absorbed) were sufficient to im-
prove the liquidity situation. Second, the banking system as a whole was rather re-
silient to the liquidity problems. 
6. Conclusions 
Global financial crisis has brought a renewed attention to the liquidity risk and 
the relationship between market and funding liquidity in banks. The so-called nega-
tive liquidity spiral, i.e. situation where declining market liquidity leads to an in-
crease in the risk of funding liquidity outflow, which in turn reinforces the declining 
trend in market liquidity, emerged to some extent even in countries which were not 
directly hit by the global financial crisis.  
24 The slope of the relationship changed from -0.006 in the pre-Lehman period to -0.025 in the post-Leh-
man period. The Chow breakpoint test (F = 23.9, prob. F(2,414) = 0.000) rejects the null hypothesis of no 
break in the time series in the month of Lehman failure. Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                    591 
In this article, we documented the existence of a negative feedback effect be-
tween market and funding liquidity in the Czech Republic. We constructed a market- 
-based funding liquidity index using data from banks’ bidding behavior in the repo 
operations of the Czech National Bank and market liquidity index of Czech financial 
markets using traditional indicators of market depth, resiliency and tightness. We 
argue that an assessment of banks’ liquidity situation based on selected aggregated 
ratio indicators should be ideally complemented by some microeconomic analysis 
that uses individual banks’ behavioral data.  
The results of the analysis show that in the peak of the financial crisis (i.e., in 
the two quarters that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008), 
the indices of market liquidity and funding liquidity showed a significant degree of 
co-movement. However, as the Czech Republic’ banking system has a strong bal-
ance-sheet liquidity position, the magnitude of the adverse liquidity problem was of 
much lesser extent than in the countries where the crisis originated. To prevent pos-
sible further deepening of the adverse liquidity loop, the central bank has reacted by 
introducing a new liquidity-providing facility which stabilized the markets.   
At the same time, it should be emphasized that although there were some 
signs of adverse liquidity loop, the effect on the banking system was only marginal. 
The Czech Republic's banking system is one of the strongest in the EU as regards 
funding liquidity. Czech banks are not dependent on foreign funding and continued 
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